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Twitter: @seankellyis


Martin Ingram Document – Parts 1-17








After the outset of public hearings by the Smithwick Tribunal, I decided to make available to them “homework” documents on Martin Ingram and his Stakeknife allegations and put on paper other thoughts to do with the same coupling.


Ten compilations below make up that work. Bear in mind what follows is a compound of non-sequential hard copy pages which I will now try to construct into a near logical computer based presentation.


As this material is being worked on in February 2012, there will be editing and “topping-up” of some text, and the inclusion of another two sections not forwarded to the Smithwick Tribunal.


Indeed, if it becomes necessary further along the trail to add to the body of work, it will be done.


The use or otherwise by the Smithwick Tribunal of documents provided is their prerogative. As we entertain different remits or priorities, it is my prerogative to try and make the content available to a wider audience, so that others can make judgement in respect of issues to do with alleged agent Stakeknife.


Though there are cogent if unspoken reasons for my doing this work, in my hands the papers are largely of academic interest because I am unable to propagate them. Other work done by me and placed on the Internet has been rendered inaccessible to search engines, or virtually so. I harbour no doubt that this intrusion, censorship by another name, results from the actions of concerned intelligence interests, directly or indirectly.


Perhaps an obliging readership, individual or organisation, might wish in support of a good if unfashionable cause, help highlight the wrongdoing of national security agencies by taking independent action to correct this deficit.


I ask, in particular, that my two non-Stakeknife web addresses be spread online. Making my name and other target words accessible to search engines would be conducive. A direct connection to the index will facilitate a sequential or selective approach to a reading.


I am an old man with limited computer savvy.


If you can assist in any way, please do.


Thank you.


(The non-Stakeknife web addresses are to be found at the end of Sections 17 & 18 of this presentation – and above.)





To Whom It May Concern – Ten Enclosures Re “Martin Ingram”


1-2) Document entitled “Martin Ingram” which is sub-divided into 39 parts, a loose term corresponding to a 39 page original. A lengthy compilation. To lighten loading it will be broken into two sections.


First half: Parts 1-17. Second half: Parts 18-39. To reiterate, there will be editing and topping up of documents on the way.


3) Document entitled “Andersonstown News and Martin Ingram” refers to an article written by Martin Ingram and published on 1 March 2001 in the Andersonstown News, I understand a Belfast bi-weekly newspaper, comprising eleven pages broken into paragraphs and interspersed with comment and analysis.


Pagination refers to the hard copy compilation, which I now attempt to translate into a computer format.


4) Document entitled “Smithwick Tribunal Statement by Ian Hurst”. A critique of a twenty page submission to the Smithwick Tribunal dated June 2011, which I selectively borrowed from and juxtaposed with previously published claims by Mr. Ingram, Hurst’s erstwhile pseudonym.


My “reply” was composed on 22 September 2011, soon after Hurst’s statement was put on the Internet.


5) A four page document entitled “Mr. Metcalfe M’Lud – Reference Stakeknife-Scappaticci”, with accompanying half page from the Sunday Independent of 15.08.04 and a web page of Galway based artist Ben Maile, it having connection to the newspaper report.


From a reading you will gather that the content of this particular is subject to caveats. I debated whether it should be included with other items, deciding that it should even if it is an incomplete study. Alone I am unable to test its worth or relevance, if any.


6) The next document is entitled “Martin Ingram – Q’s”. It contains three pages of observations and caveats with a possible relationship to previous item.


7) A one page presentation entitled “Ingram/Metcalfe – Had You Noticed?” A juxtaposition with the two previous items.


8) A document of five pages entitled “Stakeknife – Questions Asked”.


9) A three page document entitled “Smithwick Tribunal Witness – Martin Ingram/Ian Hurst.” This item distributed to media and others attending the Smithwick Tribunal at outset of public hearings.


Note: An Operation Kenova addendum was inserted in more recent years.


10) “Collateral Damage (Transcript)”. Transcript of an Australian TV documentary on the murder of two Australian solicitors in Roermond, Holland by the IRA on 27 May 1990. It includes mention of a Smithwick Tribunal witness and is broken down into numbered parts in keeping with filmed depiction of events.


11) “Collateral Damage (Context)”. This extends the previous item by lending context to events that overtook the two Australian solicitors murdered in Roermond. Working within the numbered parts of previous item, it makes observations.






Two additional documents not forwarded to the Smithwick Tribunal will be inserted within the above listed items.


The first is an article published by the Irish News, a Belfast daily newspaper, on Monday 11 December 2000 and credited to Martin Ingram. I introduce this particular under the heading, “The Irish News, Monday 11 December 2000”.


The second compilation is of correspondence to two Australian Prime Ministers’ – Kevin Rudd (one letter) and Julia Gillard (two letters), while relating to the murder in Roermond, Holland of Australian solicitors’ Nick Spanos and Stephan Melrose by the IRA, has details on my case, it having an Australian nexus.


The letters to Prime Minister Gillard contained enclosures.


Two of the three letters pre-date the Roermond TV film. All pre-date the Smithwick Tribunal public hearings, which began on 7 June 2011.


In total, this computer presentation has an index of seventeen sections with headings. Sections 15-17 have a nexus to Australia.


[In May 2014 Section 18, concerning letters to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in London, was added.]




As said in the introduction: “1) Document entitled ‘Martin Ingram’ which is sub-divided into 39 parts. A lengthy compilation. To lighten loading it will be broken into two sections. First half: Parts 1-17. Second half: Parts 18-39.”



(First Half – Parts 1-17)




This is a non sequential document made up of parts having connection to Martin Ingram, in the order listed below.


Part 1 The Sunday Times, 08.08.99 for Ingram’s CV.


Parts 2-3 Greg McCartney memo: part of a Saville Inquiry statement.


Parts 4-5 Ingram’s Witness Statement to Saville Inquiry.


Parts 6-7 Ingram’s submission to Greg McCartney (Saville Inquiry).


Part 8-9 Saville Inquiry Ruling on Martin Ingram.


Parts 10-14 Saville Inquiry Transcript and notes thereon.


Parts 15-16 The Sunday Times, 20.02.00 – A report on Ingram’s Saville Tribunal wish.


Part 17 The Observer, 15.10.03 – Ingram’s military service.




(Part 1)


The Sunday Times, 08.08.99 – Martin Ingram’s CV.



Summary of contents in newspaper pages indicated:



P6 – Ingram joined the parachute regiment but was “talent spotted” and transferred to the Intelligence Corps.


P6 – Ingram passed out of basic training in Ashford, Kent, late 1980, and posted to 3 SCT in Northern Ireland.


P6 – He soon moved to 121 Intelligence.


P7 – After the above apprenticeship, Ingram returned to Repton Manor in Ashford, Kent and trained for entry into the elite Force Research Unit. He was posted to Derry – no precision given.


P7 “After Derry, Ingram was posted for a time to Belize [Central America]. He returned to work in the unit’s detachment at St Angelo in County Fermanagh immediately after the Enniskillen Remembrance Day bombing in 1987. He remained there until 1991.”



Note 1: Ingram’s Saville Inquiry Statement of 26 July 2002, says he took up the St Angelo posting “a couple of weeks after the [8 November 1987] memorial bombing.” (See Parts 4-5 below).


Note 2: Ingram’s Saville Inquiry Statement of 26 July 2002, says he remained at St Angelo until 26 September 1990, to take up a Ministry of Defence position in London. (See Parts 4-5 below).




(Parts 2-3)


Greg McCartney Memo to Saville Inquiry





“Material supplied to the [Saville/Bloody Sunday] Inquiry by McCartney & Casey on 21 June 2002 including various notes and telephone memoranda relating to Martin Ingram” (Inquiry Pages K12.10 to K12.31 refer).


“MEMORANDUM – From solicitor Greg McCartney to Tony Gifford QC and Barry Macdonald QC – dated 07/04/00


“NOTES OF TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED AT 1pm ON 07/04/00 [Inquiry Pages K12.11 to K12.12, abridged].


K12.11 – “An unidentified male telephone caller rang the office today. He purported to have a working knowledge of how British Army Intelligence operated but declined to tell me how he had gained this knowledge. He had this morning read two differing reports in the press concerning the information that Martin McGuinness had fired the first shot on Bloody Sunday, one by Grogan and one by Moriarty. He said the former report indicated that the document produced to the Inquiry was from the Security Service while the latter indicated that the information had come from an Army informant.


“He said the Security Service consisted of MI5 and MI6 but that MI6 did not operate in NI at the time. He said he had seen the document produced to the Inquiry and the fact that it came from The Hague suggested that it was from an MI6 debrief. He stated that as they would not have been running agents in NI at the time (1984) and therefore if it were MI6 the informant would have had to be passed on to them e.g. from the Garda Siochana. He said he was aware that it was MI6 who had debriefed Seán O’Callaghan.


“However, having seen the document he believed it was a total fabrication. His reasons for saying this were because, most importantly the document did not bear any ‘grading’.


K12.12 – “…He went on to say that while he had no love for Martin McGuinness he felt that this attempt to blacken him was for the purpose of confusing the public about what really happened on Bloody Sunday and he was helping with this information because he felt the deep wounds caused by Bloody Sunday needed to be healed. He finished by stating that he didn’t like injustice. Finally he suggested he would be prepared to meet with the Counsel for the family on a confidential basis if they felt it could be of assistance.


“The conversation ended at 1.45pm.”




Note 1:


(The referred to debrief was of an MI5 agent codenamed Infliction.)


Was the above Greg McCartney submission to the Saville Inquiry a surprise to Ingram & Co? In his discussion with McCartney, Martin Ingram sought to disparage the Infliction document. Shorthand for undermining the claims of Infliction. M15 at a remove, Martin Ingram/Ian Hurst, seeking to downplay the intelligence of a very important M15 agent codenamed Infliction.


Why so, you might ask?


By his note taking and forwarding of said notes to the Saville/Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the latter’s placing them online, Mr. McCartney performed a singular service to those of us curious enough to want to learn more about at a remove state agency manipulations.


Could Infliction be Seán O’Callaghan, the Co. Kerry informer? Apparently not. O’Callaghan didn’t fear to stick his head above the parapet, as the writing of his Informer book proved. He also braved going forward as a witness in a celebrated Irish court case on behalf of The Sunday Times. My appreciation is that O’Callaghan was debriefed by MI5, Ingram says MI6, in Holland but not at The Hague, at least not initially, in 1986. While possibly also debriefed by MI6, his general status put him within the MI5 remit.


The Infliction document submitted to the Bloody Sunday Tribunal is dated 1984.


If the above effectively excludes the likelihood of Seán O’Callaghan being Infliction, one accepts the intelligence game allows for few absolutes. However, I am confident you can accept that one.


For more on O’Callaghan, see pages 220-224 of The Informer, by Seán O’Callaghan, published in 1998, by Bantam Press. I insert the O’Callaghan dimension because Martin Ingram mentioned him in his telecon with McCartney. It may have been a misdirection. As indeed his reference to the Dutch attachment.


My allusion is to a misdirection of an inverse kind.


Former MI5 employees and “whistleblowers” David Shayler and girlfriend Annie Machon, likewise attempted to do down the claims of Infliction, whom they characterized as a “bullshitter”; as did Willie Carlin, a Derry republican informer and erstwhile political colleague of Martin McGuinness.


All, including Martin Ingram were, we learn, so aroused by Infliction’s allegations against McGuinness, an intending Bloody Sunday Inquiry witness, they offered to give evidence to the tribunal.


Willie Carlin’s statement to Saville Inquiry, KC5.11 refers, said: “I have no love for Martin McGuinness but if he is to be hung out to dry it needs to be for something he has done, and not for something he has not done [re. Infliction’s claim that McGuinness fired the first shot on Bloody Sunday].” That accords with what Martin Ingram said in his telecon with Greg McCartney on 7th April 2000 (Saville Inquiry page K12.12): “[Ingram] went on to say that while he had no love for Martin McGuinness he felt that this attempt to blacken him [re. Infliction’s claim that McGuinness fired the first shot on Bloody Sunday] was for the purpose of confusing the public about what really happened on Bloody Sunday and he was helping with this information because he felt the deep wounds caused by Bloody Sunday needed to be healed.”


Infliction’s position, made by MI5 officers in statements and direct evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, withstood a probing examination from tribunal lawyers, and if incomplete because of imposed security constraints, it was found “that Infliction was generally reliable”, whereas the evidence of “whistleblowers” Shayler, Machon and Ingram did not survive a lesser inquisition.


While Willie Carlin furnished a belated statement to the Inquiry, I can find no transcript of evidence, if given.


David Shayler’s solicitor was David Wadham, the director of Liberty, who had also been Martin Ingram’s solicitor.




Note 2:


Though the Saville Inquiry gave qualified endorsement to the proxy submissions made on behalf of Infliction, his identity was not made public. The Security Service has undoubted good reasons for keeping the identity of Infliction under wraps. Infliction could have attended the Inquiry and given evidence behind screens. It was not done. Was this because – in one respect – the content of his statement(s) and ensuing evidence, along with his speech – even if electronically distorted – would have made for identification?


These considerations aside, I do not believe it is beyond the wit of a good security analyst in the republican movement to divine a likely candidate for agent Infliction, especially if Mr. McGuinness was forthcoming to such an inquiry.


However the movement may have a vested interest in not making the identity of Infliction known. In that they share common ground with MI5.


Exposing Infliction would undermine a pantheon of lies and mythology silently advanced in a game of fractious evolution of the republican movement from revolution to ballot box.


Was an honest exposition an invitation for cracks to appear in a time crafted story image, challenging for state on one hand with potentially destabilising implications for the non-truth process on the other?


On Infliction, Martin McGuinness is caught between a rock and a hard place. If he publicly admits knowing who Infliction is, as he must if evidence given by MI5 to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was a true return from a debrief, which the Inquiry accepts it is, he thereby acknowledges having fired the first shot on Sunday 30 January 1972 and having confessed this to Infliction. If loath to concede on the latter, he must know on the former. Not that he would retract his denial of having said what is credited to him for fear of the backlash it would have on his personal standing and on his political base.


Infliction it was claimed in one formula of words had “resettled outside the United Kingdom” and “who was overseas” in another, wasn’t asked to give witness evidence to the Saville Inquiry as doing so it was said could put him in danger and thereby infringe his human rights.


In their narrowest interpretation, the two above quoted mentions simply say that Infliction was not living in Britain or Northern Ireland at the time of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. If true, it does not exclude the possibility of him living, or having lived, in the republic of Ireland.


The essence of the Infliction evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry ended on Friday 9 May 2003 with testimony from serving and ex-Security Service/MI5  officers, including “whistleblowers” David Shayler and girlfriend Annie Machon. On Saturday 10 May 2003 the Stakeknife bombshell was primed for lobbing into the public arena through facilitated press disclosure the following day, giving impetus to an Anglo-Irish intelligence deception by transforming it into a hyper news event. The 11 May Stakeknife explosion was simply lift-off. Like a rolling thunder the story rumbled on, crowding out speculation on Infliction’s identity and other issues.


A case of the respective states doing their duty to self interest, and note the consummate ease with which they carried it off. What does that say about the supposed independence of our media – north and south of the border and on the “mainland”?


On Monday 12 May 2003, Martin “whistleblower” Ingram gave evidence to the Saville Inquiry. Ingram was the chief architect of the Stakeknife story at a remove. His evidence to the Inquiry, like that of David Shayler and Annie Machon, was found wanting.


Best it should with MI5 Infliction disclosure which preceded it, be buried under a triggered Stakeknife mudslide.


It was.


Returning to why Infliction did not attend the Saville Tribunal. It was said to compel a presence would have infringed his human rights, in that it could disclose his identity and endanger his life.


If there is potential in that claim, there were yet more pressing reasons for MI5 not wishing Infliction’s attendance at the tribunal.


Hoisting the human rights flag may have been an expedient to deflect from them.


Revealing the identity of Infliction directly or inadvertently through statements and/or evidence to the Inquiry, would put a cat among the pigeons, the ramifications of which are profound.


His unmasking would do more than expose the deep penetration of the republican movement, it would open a window to countless IRA operations made possible by default.


I allude to those actions effectively given the green light by intelligence agencies in acceptance of the possible consequences, including the landing, dispersal and end use of munitions from North America and Libya. As it stands, the deaths, maiming and terror resulting from the use of that weaponry, rests solely at the door of the IRA and is not properly shared with those who for years helped in good part the driving of that belligerence – agents and agencies of state.


By exclusively dwelling on the human rights of Infliction, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry negated a corresponding position on the human rights of victims of IRA actions given a free hand for operational intelligence reasons, including those compromised as a result of intelligence supplied by Infliction and other well placed informers.


Correction in these matters should come, even if that coming is too late for many.


One observes as an aside, if Infliction was as earlier noted “resettled outside the United Kingdom”, that is outside Britain and Northern Ireland, he would have been beyond the legal reach of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. It being so, the tribunal could not impose and considerations of his “human rights” would not have arisen.


It is also possible he may have non-British, or even dual, citizenship.




Note: 3


As the Stakeknife element is touched on comprehensively elsewhere in this compilation, I now confine my attention to an aspect not previously dealt with. That is, why was Mr Scappaticci chosen for the dubious tribute of being falsely branded Stakeknife?


My pennyworth of opinion is that he was out of favour with a segment of the republican movement. Given his once senior position in the internal security unit, a feared and unpopular section within the IRA disciplinary framework, he was a natural candidate for whom little enough sympathy would be extended. However, the real reason for his selection may be due to his criticism of Martin McGuinness, some of it imparted privately to third parties, but which became known – no doubt at  speed to those with an assumed brief for tuning into the intrigues in and out of the republican movement. Faceless men and women with a value system devoted to preserving whoever best accorded with their interests, no matter how much it would impact harmfully on others.


McGuinness was deemed politically indispensable, inviolable even. Scappaticci was deemed expendable. It came to pass that which needed to be done was done. In August 1999 Stakeknife was born into this world, destined for a short life – a mission to perform.


As Stakeknife’s coming was foreshadowed by the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, so too was his nemesis – Infliction, on whose altar he was propitiously “outed” on Sunday 11 May 2003.


A real agent (Infliction) protected. A bogus agent (Stakeknife) sacrificed. A classic British intelligence deception.


Yes, if simply put.


Was it, like the MI5-BSSO Operation Ward document in the 1980’s, a piece of dissembling too clever by half?




Note 4:


Earlier in the aforegoing Ingram is claimed to have said the Security Service consisted of MI5 and MI6. His terminology differs from mine. MI5 is the Security Service, MI6 the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).


One also notes the Security Service does not use an acronym like its sister organisation, the Secret Intelligence Service.




Note 5:


To lend further context to the above, I now quote the essence of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry conclusions on Infliction and Martin McGuinness. It comes under the heading: “The Provisional IRA - Chapter 147 - Volume VIII - Bloody Sunday Report”. Online.


147.349 We are unable to obtain a written statement from Infliction, or call him to give oral evidence. Nor was Martin McGuinness able to question him or even to be told who he was. The same applies to the account given by the RUC interviewee. Were we conducting a criminal trial there would in our view be substantial grounds for the submission that it would be unfair to admit this material or to place any reliance upon it. However, we are not conducting a trial but a public inquiry and we are not bound by the rules of evidence. We have to consider what weight, if any, we should give to this material, in circumstances where it has not been possible to question Infliction about his account. We also have to consider whether in the circumstances it would be so unfair, in the context of a public inquiry to make any finding based on it, that we should refrain from doing so.


147.350 We have already expressed the view that Infliction was generally reliable and did give the information in question to the Security Service. Officer A told us that he had no grounds for believing that what Infliction had told him was the result of holding a grudge against Martin McGuinness. Furthermore, it should be noted that he said to Officer B during his debriefing that ‘the Brits murdered thirteen people’ on Bloody Sunday, so it would not appear that he was inventing what he told Officer B (or Officer A) about Martin McGuinness in an attempt to provide the soldiers with a reason for opening fire. If Martin McGuinness did tell Infliction that he had fired a Thompson sub-machine gun from the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday, it is in our view likely that this is what Martin McGuinness did.


147.351 Nevertheless, our inability and that of that of those representing Martin McGuinness to question Infliction on such matters as to his relationship and the circumstances in which Martin McGuinness is said to have made the remark in question, and otherwise to test the truth of Infliction’s account and the accuracy of his recollection, have led us to conclude that it would be unwise (and indeed unfair) to place much weight on that account. On that basis we consider that this account by itself does no more than raise the possibility that, notwithstanding his denial, Martin McGuinness did fire a Thompson sub-machine gun on ‘single’ shot from the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday.


147.352 We bear in mind two other factors.


147.353 Firstly, there is the evidence, apart from that of Infliction, to the effect that on Bloody Sunday Martin McGuinness was in possession of a Thompson sub-machine gun in the area of Chamberlain Street and William Street. We have concluded that on balance, though far from certainly, this was the case. In reaching this conclusion we have taken into account that Martin McGuinness had no opportunity to question the RUC interviewee who said that he had seen Martin McGuinness with such a weapon…


147.356 We have found that Martin McGuinness was more likely than not to have been in possession of a Thompson sub-machine gun in the area of Chamberlain Street and William Street, and that he had not reached the area south of Rossville Flats when the soldiers came into the Bogside and opened fire. We cannot conclude, however, that he fired a Thompson sub-machine gun from the Rossville Flats. The Infliction material raises the possibility that he did. We have set out above our reasons for not giving much weight to this material. Accordingly, we can in this report make no finding on that point.


147.359 What we have concluded, however, is that there is no evidence that suggests to us that any member of the Provisional IRA used or intended to use the march itself for the purpose of engaging the security forces with guns or bombs. Nevertheless, we consider it likely that Martin McGuinness was armed with a Thompson sub-machine gun on Bloody Sunday and we cannot eliminate the possibility he fired this weapon after the soldiers had come into the Bogside. Furthermore, we are unable, notwithstanding their evidence, to exclude the possibility that other members of the Provisional IRA may also have carried arms. As we have already pointed out, we do not accept the evidence that suggested the Provisional IRA had no nail bombs available for use on Bloody Sunday. However, in our view no-one threw or attempted to throw a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday in any of the sectors.




(Parts 4-5)


Ingram’s Statement to Saville Tribunal, 26 July 2002



(The Ingram Statement bundle also had documents from Greg McCartney, solicitor, relating to information given by Ingram to his office, as well as a letter from the Ministry of Defence.)


Ingram Statement to Saville Inquiry: A Summary (Inquiry Pages K12.1- K12.9).


K12.1 – “I joined the Intelligence Corps in 1980.”


K12.1 – “During 1981 I was posted to 121 Intelligence section at Head Quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI).”


K12.1 – “After a short period I was given the job of maintaining the Derry Republican desk.”


K12.3 – “During 1982 I was posted to North Detachment Force Research Unit (FRU) office as a collator.”


K12.3 – “North Detachment FRU stored all the Source material generated by FINCOS/local Unit handlers and others prior to the formation of FRU in 1980.”


K12.6 – “I stayed in Derry until late 1984 when I was given a compassionate posting due to the ill health of my father. I did Security Section administrative duties relating to counter-terrorism in the UK until mid 1987 when I was posted to Belize. On my return [to England] I requested to attend a FRU course at Repton Manor, Ashford, Kent. I was then posted to St Angelo (near Enniskillen) a couple of weeks after the memorial bombing; this posting was to augment the small detachment in response to the bombing... I remained at St Angelo until 26 September 1990…”


K12.6 – “I sought and received a posting to MOD in London, working for Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) primarily on the Israel and Syrian desks. This posting was an EPV (Enhanced Positive Vetting) position, with regular and constant access to Top Secret material. EPV is the highest clearance. In accordance with my obligations, I notified the vetting authorities regarding my intention to marry. My proposed marriage presented difficulties over vetting. The choices of permanent postings would have limited my career options and the only alternative was for me not to marry my wife. As a result of this, I applied for and received a Premature Voluntary Retirement (PVR) which cost me £600. I left the Army with an Exemplary record.”


K12.6 – “Sometime during 2000 Liam Clarke of The Sunday Times acted as a messenger between Greg McCartney, a solicitor to a number of the families who are represented at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and myself. To the best of my ability, and bearing in mind my responsibilities under the Official Secrets [K12.7] Act (OSA), I helped McCartney with a series of questions. I supplied Mr. McCartney with this information on a voluntary basis for two primary reasons. First, because I am suspicious that the Army would not make a full disclosure of all relevant documents to the Inquiry, and secondly, because I personally believed that the Inquiry should be given full and complete information to enable it to examine and report on the events on Bloody Sunday so that justice can be seen to be done for all concerned.”





On page nine, final page of this item, are my handwritten notes. “The writing of this document is professional, at least in its use of grammar, if not all of its content, some of which would win a gold medal for a brass neck. Was it written in conjunction with another party? I am saying it may not be entirely the writing of Martin Ingram.”


I recommend a reading of an undated missive from Martin Ingram to Greg McCartney, solicitor, listed in his statement bundle to the Saville Inquiry, pages K12.13 and K12.14 refer. Selectively carried below (and available online).




(Parts 6-7)


Ingram’s Submission to Greg McCartney






Excerpts from an undated submission by Martin Ingram to Greg McCartney, solicitor, on pages K12.13 and K12.14 of the Martin Ingram Statement bundle to the Saville Inquiry. I relate to [K12.13]: “INFLICTION AND SOURCE REPORTS IN GENERAL…


“…Source/Agent Reports[.] the [sic] following are the only Agencies that operate in thearte [sic].”


K12.13 – Ingram says that in the early days of the Troubles, the RUC were “Intelligence nieve” [sic] and their coverage was “sparse”. “It is probable over the last 28 years that the Agents will have from time to time made information available to their handlers although i [sic] would expect contemperanous [sic] reports to be few and far between…”


K12.13 – “Box [MI5 = BOX] are not the best at working in an [sic] hostile environment and consequently their coverage in Derry was minimal.”


K12.13 – “The authenticity of the [Infliction] report is open to question, not because it raises a ‘Red Herring’ i.e. Mr. McGiuness [sic] involvement in firing the ‘First’ shot that precipitated the tragic day but because the report is written in terms that i [sic] have never seen in a BOX report. The important detail missing either by design or accident is the grading of the Source i.e. his (Agent) reliability in his previous reporting and any collateral intelligence to back up the information imparted, e.g. B2 usually reliable and there is collateral, it cannot be over exaggerated the importance of the Grading because the reader would not normally be aware of the identity of the Agent, thus he or she must make a reasoned judgement to the importance of the information. The signal was sent from [The] Hague, this is consistent with an extraction and resettlement of an exposed recovered Agent and the final briefing is being undertaken remote from his normal environment…


“The state appears to be dining ála [sic] carte, it is unfair to cherry pick and use only the Intelligence that suits [K12.14] your perception of events.


“All Intelligence reports presented to the inquiry [sic] can easily be authenticated by inspecting the classified document register. Each document as [sic] a life and this is relatively easy to follow if you know where to look.


“Regards. please [sic] make allowance for the spelling no spell check on this model.”






1) In the above Ingram tacitly accepts the Infliction report is an MI5 document, even if he questions its authenticity because “by design or accident” it is bereft of grading. Yet in a Memorandum – re. Ingram-Greg McCartney telephone exchange on 07.04.00, supplied by McCartney & Casey, solicitors, to the Saville Inquiry on 21 June 2002, Ingram implied the report was an MI6 debrief, also claiming it was a “total fabrication”. Between 7 April 2000 and the above undated submission to McCartney & Casey, and in his third witness statement to the Tribunal dated 17.03.03 – pages K12.40 to K12.42 refer – that view was moderated. Indeed, in the latter there was a retreat from a denial to an acceptance of the existence of MI5 agent Infliction.


Was Martin Ingram’s original questioning of the authenticity of the Infliction report due to its lack of grading and his reference to news articles used to make an artificial point to set up a process in support of his brief?


2) My end document hand written notes. “Poor presentation. Is the above a natural Ingram document? Other work by him seems to have had professional input in the preparation. Like his Bloody Sunday Inquiry witness statements and articles said to have been written by him in the Irish News, the Andersonstown News and the Guardian.”


Was the above submission a pick and mix - Ingram’s natural shaping of a general MI5 direction? Whatever, it appears to be a lend a hand gesture of little worth.


I’m saying that like almost all security leaks given by “whistleblowers”, it takes a couple of steps forward and then falls flat on its face. Nearer to ephemera than intelligence worth. Only staying aloft because it is given wings by a driven media.


Undated. Misspelling. Bad grammar. Sloppy typing. The real Ingram?




(Parts 8-9)


Saville Inquiry Ruling on Martin Ingram



Martin Ingram – Saville Inquiry Ruling on Screening, etc. – 14 April 2003





P1 – “This is an application by Martin Ingram (a pseudonym), a former serving soldier who is due to give evidence before the Inquiry.


P2 – “The application seeks an ‘order to implement appropriate measures to ensure the screening of his physical appearance and the non disclosure of his true identity when he gives evidence before the Inquiry.’ He asserts that he ‘has genuine and reasonable fears as to the potential consequences of disclosure of his personal details and his physical appearance which justify the exceptional measures of screening and non disclosure of his identity.’ He further asserts that the grant of this application ‘will not prejudice the fundamental objective of the Inquiry to find the truth about Bloody Sunday…’




P6 – “12 Martin Ingram’s claim for anonymity is based essentially on the threat to his own safety if his identity is revealed. The certificate by the Defence Secretary supports anonymity by reference to the safety of members of special units which, it is said would be jeopardized if the identity of Martin Ingram was known.


P7 – “15 Taking into account these considerations, including the exposition of the court of appeal in R. v. Saville (28 June 1999), we are satisfied that Martin Ingram’s subjective fears are objectively justified and he should have anonymity in these proceedings.




P7 – “16 As with anonymity, the claims for screening is supported by the Defence Secretary’s [PII] certificate.”






The application for anonymity and screening was granted. The ban included no videoing or public viewing of the witness.


Contrast the screening request to the photographs in the “Eye-Spy” magazine interview (an undated online page but post 2004) and the open face Suzanne Breen Sunday Tribune interview (20.02.06). The former has two photographs of Martin Ingram, one front face, the other profile. In each a misht cloud obscures the essence of his features, but not the full face. Indeed, sufficient of his physiognomy, front and side, remains exposed to make for a reasonable possibility of identification.


Is there an answer to a request for screening in the first instance (Bloody Sunday Inquiry in 2003) and being cavalier in the second instance, the Eye Spy photographs – of 2005-6? – and subsequently? Is the former there to preclude his image because exposure would make known his whereabouts in the republic of Ireland, before and after his evidence to the Saville Inquiry, especially when writing and publishing the Stakeknife book, wisely after giving evidence to the Inquiry?


Could the purpose of the Eye Spy magazine photographs be a way of saying that a man in Ireland was not Martin Ingram?


[On Wednesday 11.07.12 several lines of angry text were deleted at this point; they were originally penned in response to external interference to my non Internet connected computer when writing previous full paragraph in a Friday 02.09.11edit. A regular experience.]




(Parts 10-14)


Saville Inquiry Transcript and Notes Thereon



Saville Inquiry Transcript, Day 329, Monday 12 May 2003



(Ingram questioned by Mr. Glasgow QC “[representing] a large number of the soldiers who were present on the day and it is on their behalf that I want to ask you just about two matters.” His questioning began on Inquiry page 145. We begin on page 152 – Line 14.)


“Q The last matter, is this: you tell the Tribunal, but by [al]l means look at it, if you like, at K12.7 [Ingram’s Statement]. Of course you shall see it, 2.7 [sic] at the top of the page, which is part of your paragraph 13, that you are concerned that the Inquiry should be given full and complete information to enable it to examine and report on the events of Bloody Sunday.


“That was a sincere wish; was it?” “A. I hope so.” “Q. If that is right, Mr. Ingram, why did you not approach this Tribunal directly; why did you decide to take a roundabout route, if I may put it like that?” [P153] “A. I think the Tribunal will tell you privately that I had a very good reason for that, which reasons you are obviously not aware of.” “Q. If I am in ignorance it may be right that I am kept there, I often am.


“If we look at the final paragraph of Mr. McCartney’s very helpful note [K12.11 to K12.12], K12.12 – we must not be misled by the date at the top, I think that is the date when he very kindly ran this off his computer so the Tribunal could see it. This is an attendance note of a conference with you that lasted, as we see, one and three-quarter hours [It was three quarters of an hour].” “A. It was a telephone conversation.”


“The very last thing that you apparently said to him was that you suggested that you would be prepared to meet with Counsel for the family on a confidential basis and not simply doing what the vast majority of other people have done and go to the Tribunal and tell them the truth?” “A. Well, let me just – if I may, I will take the [P154] opportunity, in so much within the parameters that I can.


“My details were leaked to this Inquiry by a Special Branch officer and when I was arrested under the Official Secrets Act in relation to other matters, I was then in the process of helping Mr. McCartney. Now, given personal circumstances, of which the Inquiry are well aware, I was reluctant to be actually here today; this was not my wish to be here, and I do not mean that as in any, um, derogatory way to the families, because I am more than happy to be here today. But from a personal point of view, this is not good for me.


“However, I was persuaded by the Inquiry, on the foot of some legal action that if I did not – and that is why I am here today, sir.” “Q. When you had that conversation and offered to meet the Counsel to the families on a confidential basis in April 2000… “A. Yes.” “Q. …had you in fact already approached the Tribunal yourself, because if that is the position I have misstated it and I must correct it?” “A. No.”


“Q. Because that appears to have been indicated by Mr. [Eamonn] McCann [P155] in his newspaper article, that you approached the Tribunal in February?” “A. I do not know the dates. We had been in – basically what happened was: Mr. [Liam] Clarke did an article in the paper, which was brief and to the point, which was that basically I do not think all the documents would have discovered up under discovery and from that I think the Inquiry wrote to Mr. Clarke – and trying to seek information.


“In the intervening period I was arrested and, contrary to any agreement they had with the police, they leaked the details to the Inquiry and the Inquiry then contacted my legal advisors.”


“Q. All I was asking, and I hope there is nothing improper in this, Mr. Ingram: had you already spoken to the Inquiry before you telephoned the families’ lawyers and offered to meet them confidentially?” “A. The answer to that is a straight: no. I spoke to the families –“ “Q. First?” “A. And let me explain why. My intent was not to give formal evidence because of my personal circumstances, nevertheless I wanted to help the families.”


“Q. I am sure that is right and I do not doubt your desire to help the families. But you should have the [P156] opportunity, I think of just dealing with the newspaper articles, because they may be wrong. You very kindly produced them for us at K12.37. What we were told in those articles – there are three of them, but they are almost identical, the second paragraph [K12,37 – The Sunday Tribune, By Eamonn McCann]: ‘The man known to the media as Martin Ingram, met with lawyers for the Tribunal under Lord Saville three months ago.’ That would indicate that you met the Tribunal at the end of February. I think on what you are saying that must be a mistake?”


“A. No, I think that is actually accurate, I think – I do not imagine I would have said I had met with them if I had not met with them. I am sure the Inquiry will tell you when and where we met – they will not tell you where, but will tell you when.” “Q. Again the Tribunal will know the position, but I thought it right you should have the opportunity of dealing with it.” “A. No, I think –“ “Q. Mr. McCartney’s note, you see, indicates that the first contact you had was on 7th April when you were offering to meet the Counsel for the family on a confidential basis, whereas you yourself are very properly exhibiting a newspaper article – in face [sic] three newspaper [P157] articles – which would indicate you had already met the Tribunal lawyers in February.


“I wonder whether you could help the Tribunal just to clear up that apparent inconsistency?” “A. Although Mr. McCartney may not remember, I did actually speak to Mr. McCartney a considerable period before –“ “LORD GIFFORD [interjecting] My question was: is this not a different year? The newspaper article is 2001 and the McCartney notes are 2000.” “Mr. GLASGOW: I am very grateful, that may clarify. Does that help?” “A. [Ingram] That helps a lot, sir.”


“[GLASGOW] The newspaper we have on the screen is 2000. I am afraid I have not got a date on mine, but it is 2001. Thank you very much.” “A. [Ingram] Does that –“ “A. [GLASGOW] Thank you very much, Mr. Ingram, yes, it does indeed.”


“Questioned by Mr. Roxburgh


“LORD SAVILLE: Mr. Roxburgh, do you have any information on dates and so on in relation to Mr. Ingram approaching or being approached by this Inquiry?” “ Mr. ROXBURGH: No, I do not have dates to hand about that very early stage, I am afraid.”






1) Ingram teases on being a witness under duress, playing with Counsel, saying: “Now, given personal circumstances of which the Inquiry are well aware, I was reluctant to be actually here today.” Ultimately, he is forthcoming: “However, I was persuaded by the Inquiry, on the foot of some legal action that if I did not – that is why I am here today, sir.”


The tribunal was not forthcoming on when he was forthcoming, when they communicated with him or how they communicated with him, was it through his solicitor John Wadham? The picture painted is that Ingram was only there under duress. That’s not the Martin Ingram we had presented to us by Liam Clarke in The Sunday Times on 20 February 2000.


2) Page 2 headlines: “Army agent offers to give Bloody Sunday evidence.”


Paragraph two: “Ingram has offered to cast fresh light on the shooting dead of 13 civil-rights marchers by the Parachute Regiment on Bloody Sunday in 1972 if he is allowed to testify anonymously at Lord Saville’s public inquiry, which opens next month.”


Paragraph five: “Ingram said last night: ’I am very willing to help with these inquiries. I believe it is part of the healing process in Northern Ireland for the truth to come out and I will have things to say about what I know of the IRA as well as the army, but I do not want to be jailed for doing so.’”


Paragraph six: “The offer to help has been made through John Wadham, the director of Liberty, who is Ingram’s solicitor. Wadham, one of Britain’s leading civil rights experts, said: ‘Martin has shown courage in coming forward to expose wrongdoing and should not be turned into the villain.’”


Paragraph twelve: “Last night Wadham said: ‘Journalists who try to investigate wrongdoing by the state should not be subject to this treatment. I will now be contacting Lord Saville’s and John Stevens’ inquiry to offer my client’s services to them, provided he is not prosecuted for coming forward.’”


(Emphasis where used is mine.)


3) That’s some conflict. I ask: why the script change? Was it because the reluctant man of honour made for a better image of a witness: “I didn’t want to get involved but was ‘persuaded’”, sort of thing? Was Ingram’s testimony made more compelling by virtue of his perceived impartiality – being there on threat “of some legal action” consequent of dirty tricks by Special Branch?


One is reminded that Special Branch are the official cat’s paw of MI5. Some have it that they and MI5 combined are what is known as the security services. Others say M15 and M16 are the security services. Maybe the combo is down to what you fancy!


4) An additional puzzlement is entailed. At the time of the Saville Tribunal sitting in Derry and at the relevant time in London, Mr Ingram was said to have been resident in the republic of Ireland, placing him outside UK jurisdiction and facilitating his writing the Stakeknife book. A domicile that would put him beyond the reach of a UK court or tribunal. And, to take him at his word, he was by then a naturalised Irish citizen with an Irish passport.


In reality, Martin Ingram could have lawfully given the Margaret Thatcher “victory” salute to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry without fear of retribution. Perhaps it slipped his mind where he was living and that he was at the time, officially at least, a “Paddy”?


5) Based on the limited excerpt of the Inquiry transcript reproduced above, it seems that someone was remiss in the homework supplied to Mr. Glasgow, whose language proclaims a person decent and gentlemanly. However, one queries if these were the best qualities for the brief, given that the Inquiry was inquisitorial rather than adversarial?


Maybe an attack dog for a rough diamond (Ingram) would have been more efficacious?


[Evidence, as I see it, that my non Internet connected computer is again subject to intrusion. I refer to the writing of the previous sentence. The interference now appears to have ceased.]


Which leads to a separate question. By what criteria were counsel chosen? Was there unseen input into selection? The British have a long history of ensuring the outcome of committees or panels of inquiry by manipulating their loading.


A tradition of balanced bias.




(Parts 15-16)


The Sunday Times, 20.02.00 – Ingram on the Saville Inquiry



Though this newspaper article is selectively referred to in above analysis of Martin Ingram’s Saville Inquiry transcript, Counsel for a “large number of the soldiers present on [Bloody Sunday]” seemed unaware of its existence. A pity. If he had only known, he would surely have avoided the background confusion to Ingram’s evidence. There may be an answer for the conflict.


Whatever, the full article is carried below.


The Sunday Times, 20 February 2000 (Page 2):


“Army agent offers to give Bloody Sunday evidence – By Liam Clarke


“A BRITISH Army whistleblower has offered to give evidence of how colleagues burned a police office to obstruct an inquiry into collusion with loyalist terror groups. The soldier, better known by the pseudonym Martin Ingram, has been the subject of a nationwide manhunt since he made the claim to The Sunday Times last November. * “Ingram has offered to shed fresh light on the shooting dead of 13 civil-rights marchers by the Parachute Regiment on Bloody Sunday in 1972 if he is allowed to testify anonymously at Lord Saville’s public inquiry, which opens next month. * “In an interview with The Sunday Times last year, he said he had seen intelligence files relating to Bloody Sunday which showed the IRA had been ordered not to open fire. This contradicts claims by the British army that they expected to be attacked.


“The Sunday Times has been bound by an injunction, the precise terms of which it is forbidden to reveal, since it published Ingram’s story of his work in the secretive Force Research Unit, which handles all military intelligence informants in Northern Ireland. The injunction prevents us giving further details of his knowledge of events on Bloody Sunday. * “Ingram said last night: ‘I am very willing to help with these inquiries. I believe it is part of the healing process in Northern Ireland for the truth to come out and I will have things to say about what I know of the IRA as well as the army, but I do not want to be jailed for doing so.’


“The offer to help has been made through John Wadham, the director of Liberty, who is Ingram’s solicitor. Wadham, one of Britain’s leading civil rights experts, said: ‘Martin has shown courage to come forward to expose wrongdoing and should not be turned into the villain.’ * “One of Ingram’s most sensitive revelations was that an army undercover unit, trained in burglary, burned offices occupied by John Stevens, then the deputy chief constable of Cambridgeshire, at Carrickfergus near Belfast. The covert methods of entry team, instructors for the intelligence corps, burnt the office because Stevens, now the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was planning to arrest one of FRUs top agents.


“The agent Brian Nelson, was acting as intelligence officer for the Ulster Freedom Fighters, a loyalist terrorist group. Nelson was jailed on several counts of conspiracy to murder in 1992.


“Stevens is formally in charge of the hunt for Ingram and is also heading an inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane, a solicitor killed by the UFF, allegedly with FRU collusion, in 1989. * “Another sensational revelation concerned a decision to allow a number of guns to remain in the hands of the IRA in order to preserve the cover of an informant. One of these guns was used in the murder of Neil Clarke, a young British soldier on patrol in Londonderry in 1984. * “The newspaper took great pains to ensure legitimate methods of intelligence gathering were not endangered and that no living agents were compromised. Despite the care that was taken, the MoD and Metropolitan Police special branch have launched an extensive search for Ingram. In the manhunt at least one soldier has been arrested on suspicion of being Ingram and several others have been questioned.


“A relative of the arrested soldier, who has been released, has had her house wrecked in a police raid and a special branch investigation has also been launched in an effort to discover the paper’s sources. According to information given by the arrested soldier, the telephone of at least one Sunday Times journalist has been tapped and transcripts of conversations made.


“Last night Wadham said: ‘Journalists who try to investigate wrongdoing by the state should not be subject to this treatment. I will now be contacting Lord Saville’s and John Stevens’ inquiry to offer my client’s services to them, provided he is not prosecuted for coming forward.’


“A solicitor acting for the family of James Wray, one of the civil-rights marchers killed on Bloody Sunday, has also called for Ingram to be allowed to testify. Greg McCartney said: ‘We have always encouraged people with relevant information to come forward and we have taken the view that no person should face any punishment for giving the inquiry relevant information even if it is in breach of the Official Secrets Act.’


“’So-called whistleblowers should be encouraged to speak without sanction.’”






(Part 17)


The Observer, 05.10.03 – Ingram’s Military Service


The Observer, 05.10.03 (Online)



P1 – “Ingram served as an NCO for 12 years in the British Army’s Intelligence Corps and six years inside the Force Research Unit.”


Note: The above claims 18 years service, which, to my knowledge, is the minimum amount of years for pension qualification. If true, it contradicts all other presentations on Ingram’s army term. Ingram’s Witness Statement to the Saville Tribunal (26.07.02) says he enlisted in 1980, and the book, Stakeknife – Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland (2004), says he left in 1991.


The writer applies the English language badly. Another reading would say that Ingram did twelve years in the army, almost all in G2 (Intelligence Corps), of which six years were in the Force Research Unit, an elite unit within G2. So twelve years in all.




NOTE: End of First Half of “Martin Ingram” Document – Parts 1-17. Emphasis used is mine.


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