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Mr. Justice Peter Smithwick (Enclosures) |
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Twitter: @seankellyis
Martin Ingram Document
– Parts 1-17
(6)
*
STAKEKNIFE –
PREAMBLE
After the outset of public hearings by the Smithwick
Tribunal, I decided to make available to them “homework” documents on Martin
Ingram and his Stakeknife allegations and put on paper other thoughts to do
with the same coupling.
Ten compilations below make up that work. Bear in
mind what follows is a compound of non-sequential hard copy pages which I will
now try to construct into a near logical computer based presentation.
As this material is being worked on in February 2012,
there will be editing and “topping-up” of some text, and the inclusion of
another two sections not forwarded to the Smithwick Tribunal.
Indeed, if it becomes necessary further along the
trail to add to the body of work, it will be done.
The use or otherwise by the Smithwick Tribunal of
documents provided is their prerogative. As we entertain different remits or
priorities, it is my prerogative to try and make the content available to a
wider audience, so that others can make judgement in respect of issues to do
with alleged agent Stakeknife.
Though there are cogent if unspoken reasons for my
doing this work, in my hands the papers are largely of
academic interest because I am unable to propagate them. Other work done by me
and placed on the Internet has been rendered inaccessible to search engines, or
virtually so. I harbour no doubt that this intrusion, censorship by another
name, results from the actions of concerned intelligence interests, directly or
indirectly.
Perhaps an obliging readership, individual or
organisation, might wish in support of a good if unfashionable cause, help
highlight the wrongdoing of national security agencies by taking independent
action to correct this deficit.
I ask, in particular, that my two non-Stakeknife web
addresses be spread online. Making my name and other target words accessible to
search engines would be conducive. A direct connection to the index will
facilitate a sequential or selective approach to a reading.
I am an old man with limited computer savvy.
If you can assist in any way, please do.
Thank you.
(The non-Stakeknife web addresses are to be found at
the end of Sections 17 & 18 of this presentation – and above.)
*****
To Whom It May Concern – Ten Enclosures
Re “Martin Ingram”
1-2) Document entitled “Martin Ingram” which is
sub-divided into 39 parts, a loose term corresponding to a 39 page original. A lengthy compilation. To lighten loading it will be broken
into two sections.
First half: Parts 1-17. Second half: Parts 18-39. To reiterate, there will be editing and topping up of documents on
the way.
3) Document entitled “Andersonstown News and Martin
Ingram” refers to an article written by Martin Ingram and published on 1 March 2001
in the Andersonstown News, I understand a Belfast bi-weekly newspaper,
comprising eleven pages broken into paragraphs and interspersed with comment
and analysis.
Pagination refers to the hard copy compilation, which
I now attempt to translate into a computer format.
4) Document entitled “Smithwick Tribunal Statement by
Ian Hurst”. A critique of a twenty page submission to the Smithwick Tribunal
dated June 2011, which I selectively borrowed from and juxtaposed with
previously published claims by Mr. Ingram, Hurst’s erstwhile pseudonym.
My “reply” was composed on 22 September 2011, soon
after Hurst’s statement was put on the Internet.
5) A four page document entitled “Mr. Metcalfe M’Lud
– Reference Stakeknife-Scappaticci”, with accompanying half page from the
Sunday Independent of 15.08.04 and a web page of Galway based artist Ben Maile,
it having connection to the newspaper report.
From a reading you will gather that the content of
this particular is subject to caveats. I debated whether it should be included
with other items, deciding that it should even if it is an incomplete study.
Alone I am unable to test its worth or relevance, if any.
6) The next document is entitled “Martin Ingram –
Q’s”. It contains three pages of observations and caveats with a possible
relationship to previous item.
7) A one page presentation entitled “Ingram/Metcalfe
– Had You Noticed?” A juxtaposition with the two previous items.
8) A document of five pages entitled “Stakeknife –
Questions Asked”.
9) A three page document entitled “Smithwick Tribunal
Witness – Martin Ingram/Ian Hurst.” This item distributed to media and others
attending the Smithwick Tribunal at outset of public hearings.
Note: An Operation Kenova addendum was inserted in
more recent years.
10) “Collateral
Damage (Transcript)”. Transcript of an Australian TV documentary on the
murder of two Australian solicitors in Roermond, Holland by the IRA on 27 May
1990. It includes mention of a Smithwick Tribunal witness and is broken down
into numbered parts in keeping with filmed depiction of events.
11) “Collateral
Damage (Context)”. This extends the previous item by lending context to
events that overtook the two Australian solicitors murdered in Roermond.
Working within the numbered parts of previous item, it makes observations.
*
Note:
Two additional documents not forwarded to the
Smithwick Tribunal will be inserted within the above listed items.
The first is an article published by the Irish News, a
Belfast daily newspaper, on Monday 11 December 2000 and credited to Martin
Ingram. I introduce this particular under the heading, “The Irish News, Monday
11 December 2000”.
The second compilation is of correspondence to two
Australian Prime Ministers’ – Kevin Rudd (one letter) and Julia Gillard (two
letters), while relating to the murder in Roermond, Holland of Australian
solicitors’ Nick Spanos and Stephan Melrose by the IRA, has details on my case,
it having an Australian nexus.
The letters to Prime Minister Gillard contained
enclosures.
Two of the three letters pre-date the Roermond TV
film. All pre-date the Smithwick Tribunal public hearings, which began on 7
June 2011.
In total, this computer presentation has an index of
seventeen sections with headings. Sections 15-17 have a nexus to Australia.
[In May 2014 Section 18, concerning letters to the
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in London, was added.]
*****
As said in the introduction: “1) Document entitled
‘Martin Ingram’ which is sub-divided into 39 parts. A lengthy compilation. To
lighten loading it will be broken into two sections. First half: Parts 1-17.
Second half: Parts 18-39.”
(First Half – Parts
1-17)
Note:
This is a non sequential document made up of parts
having connection to Martin Ingram, in the order listed below.
Part 1 The Sunday Times, 08.08.99 for Ingram’s CV.
Parts 2-3 Greg McCartney memo: part of a Saville
Inquiry statement.
Parts 4-5 Ingram’s Witness Statement to Saville
Inquiry.
Parts 6-7 Ingram’s submission to Greg McCartney
(Saville Inquiry).
Part 8-9 Saville Inquiry Ruling on Martin Ingram.
Parts 10-14 Saville Inquiry Transcript and notes
thereon.
Parts 15-16 The Sunday Times, 20.02.00 – A report on
Ingram’s Saville Tribunal wish.
Part 17 The Observer, 15.10.03 – Ingram’s military
service.
*****
(Part 1)
The Sunday Times,
08.08.99 – Martin Ingram’s CV.
Summary of contents in newspaper pages indicated:
P6 – Ingram joined the parachute regiment but was “talent
spotted” and transferred to the Intelligence Corps.
P6 – Ingram passed out of basic training in Ashford,
Kent, late 1980, and posted to 3 SCT in Northern Ireland.
P6 – He soon moved to 121 Intelligence.
P7 – After the above apprenticeship, Ingram returned
to Repton Manor in Ashford, Kent and trained for entry into the elite Force
Research Unit. He was posted to Derry – no precision given.
P7 “After Derry, Ingram was posted for a time to
Belize [Central America]. He returned to work in the unit’s detachment at St
Angelo in County Fermanagh immediately after the Enniskillen Remembrance Day
bombing in 1987. He remained there until 1991.”
Note 1: Ingram’s Saville Inquiry Statement of 26 July
2002, says he took up the St Angelo posting “a couple of weeks after the [8
November 1987] memorial bombing.” (See Parts 4-5 below).
Note 2: Ingram’s Saville Inquiry Statement of 26 July
2002, says he remained at St Angelo until 26 September 1990, to take up a
Ministry of Defence position in London. (See Parts 4-5 below).
*****
(Parts 2-3)
Greg McCartney Memo
to Saville Inquiry
CONTENTS:
“Material supplied to the [Saville/Bloody Sunday]
Inquiry by McCartney & Casey on 21 June 2002 including various notes and
telephone memoranda relating to Martin Ingram” (Inquiry Pages K12.10 to K12.31
refer).
“MEMORANDUM – From solicitor Greg McCartney to Tony
Gifford QC and Barry Macdonald QC – dated 07/04/00
“NOTES OF TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED AT 1pm ON 07/04/00
[Inquiry Pages K12.11 to K12.12, abridged].
K12.11 – “An unidentified male telephone caller rang
the office today. He purported to have a working knowledge of how British Army
Intelligence operated but declined to tell me how he had gained this knowledge.
He had this morning read two differing reports in the press concerning the
information that Martin McGuinness had fired the first shot on Bloody Sunday,
one by Grogan and one by Moriarty. He said the former report indicated that the
document produced to the Inquiry was from the Security Service while the latter
indicated that the information had come from an Army informant.
“He said the Security Service consisted of MI5 and
MI6 but that MI6 did not operate in NI at the time. He said he had seen the document
produced to the Inquiry and the fact that it came from The Hague suggested that
it was from an MI6 debrief. He stated that as they would not have been running
agents in NI at the time (1984) and therefore if it were MI6 the informant
would have had to be passed on to them e.g. from the Garda Siochana. He said he
was aware that it was MI6 who had debriefed Seán O’Callaghan.
“However, having seen the document he believed it was
a total fabrication. His reasons for saying this were because, most importantly
the document did not bear any ‘grading’.
K12.12 – “…He went on to say that while he had no
love for Martin McGuinness he felt that this attempt to blacken him was for the
purpose of confusing the public about what really happened on Bloody Sunday and
he was helping with this information because he felt the deep wounds caused by
Bloody Sunday needed to be healed. He finished by stating that he didn’t like
injustice. Finally he suggested he would be prepared to meet with the Counsel
for the family on a confidential basis if they felt it could be of assistance.
“The conversation ended at 1.45pm.”
*
Note 1:
(The referred to debrief was of an MI5 agent
codenamed Infliction.)
Was the above Greg McCartney submission to the
Saville Inquiry a surprise to Ingram & Co? In his discussion with
McCartney, Martin Ingram sought to disparage the Infliction document. Shorthand
for undermining the claims of Infliction. M15 at a remove, Martin Ingram/Ian
Hurst, seeking to downplay the intelligence of a very important M15 agent
codenamed Infliction.
Why so, you might ask?
By his note taking and forwarding of said notes to
the Saville/Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the latter’s placing them online, Mr.
McCartney performed a singular service to those of us curious enough to want to
learn more about at a remove state agency manipulations.
Could Infliction be Seán O’Callaghan, the Co. Kerry
informer? Apparently not. O’Callaghan didn’t fear to stick his head above the
parapet, as the writing of his Informer
book proved. He also braved going forward as a witness in a celebrated Irish
court case on behalf of The Sunday
Times. My appreciation is that O’Callaghan was debriefed by MI5, Ingram says
MI6, in Holland but not at The Hague, at least not initially, in 1986. While
possibly also debriefed by MI6, his general status put him within the MI5
remit.
The Infliction document submitted to the Bloody
Sunday Tribunal is dated 1984.
If the above effectively excludes the likelihood of
Seán O’Callaghan being Infliction, one accepts the intelligence game allows for
few absolutes. However, I am confident you can accept that one.
For more on O’Callaghan, see pages 220-224 of The Informer, by Seán O’Callaghan,
published in 1998, by Bantam Press. I insert the O’Callaghan dimension because
Martin Ingram mentioned him in his telecon with McCartney. It may have been a
misdirection. As indeed his reference to the Dutch attachment.
My allusion is to a misdirection of an inverse kind.
Former MI5 employees and “whistleblowers” David Shayler
and girlfriend Annie Machon, likewise attempted to do down the claims of
Infliction, whom they characterized as a “bullshitter”; as did Willie Carlin, a
All, including Martin Ingram were, we learn, so
aroused by Infliction’s allegations against McGuinness, an intending Bloody
Sunday Inquiry witness, they offered to give evidence to the tribunal.
Willie Carlin’s statement to Saville Inquiry, KC5.11
refers, said: “I have no love for Martin McGuinness but if he is to be hung out
to dry it needs to be for something he has done, and not for something he has
not done [re. Infliction’s claim that McGuinness fired the first shot on Bloody
Sunday].” That accords with what Martin Ingram said in his telecon with Greg
McCartney on 7th April 2000 (Saville Inquiry page K12.12): “[Ingram] went on to
say that while he had no love for Martin McGuinness he felt that this attempt
to blacken him [re. Infliction’s claim that McGuinness fired the first shot on
Bloody Sunday] was for the purpose of confusing the public about what really
happened on Bloody Sunday and he was helping with this information because he
felt the deep wounds caused by Bloody Sunday needed to be healed.”
Infliction’s position, made by MI5 officers in
statements and direct evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, withstood a
probing examination from tribunal lawyers, and if incomplete because of imposed
security constraints, it was found “that Infliction was generally reliable”,
whereas the evidence of “whistleblowers” Shayler,
Machon and Ingram did not survive a lesser inquisition.
While Willie Carlin furnished a belated statement to
the Inquiry, I can find no transcript of evidence, if given.
David Shayler’s solicitor was David Wadham, the
director of Liberty, who had also been Martin Ingram’s solicitor.
*
Note 2:
Though the Saville Inquiry gave qualified endorsement
to the proxy submissions made on behalf of Infliction, his identity was not
made public. The Security Service has undoubted good reasons for keeping the
identity of Infliction under wraps. Infliction could have attended the Inquiry
and given evidence behind screens. It was not done. Was this because – in one
respect – the content of his statement(s) and ensuing evidence, along with his
speech – even if electronically distorted – would have made for identification?
These considerations aside, I do not believe it is
beyond the wit of a good security analyst in the republican movement to divine
a likely candidate for agent Infliction, especially if Mr. McGuinness was
forthcoming to such an inquiry.
However the movement may have a vested interest in
not making the identity of Infliction known. In that they share common ground
with MI5.
Exposing Infliction would undermine a pantheon of
lies and mythology silently advanced in a game of fractious evolution of the
republican movement from revolution to ballot box.
Was an honest exposition an invitation for cracks to
appear in a time crafted story image, challenging for state on one hand with
potentially destabilising implications for the non-truth process on the other?
On Infliction, Martin McGuinness is caught between a
rock and a hard place. If he publicly admits knowing who Infliction is, as he
must if evidence given by MI5 to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was a true return
from a debrief, which the Inquiry accepts it is, he thereby acknowledges having
fired the first shot on Sunday 30 January 1972 and having confessed this to
Infliction. If loath to concede on the latter, he must know on the former. Not
that he would retract his denial of having said what is credited to him for
fear of the backlash it would have on his personal standing and on his
political base.
Infliction it was claimed in one formula of words had
“resettled outside the United Kingdom” and “who was overseas” in another,
wasn’t asked to give witness evidence to the Saville Inquiry as doing so it was
said could put him in danger and thereby infringe his human rights.
In their narrowest interpretation, the two above
quoted mentions simply say that Infliction was not living in Britain or
Northern Ireland at the time of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. If true, it does not
exclude the possibility of him living, or having lived, in the republic of
Ireland.
The essence of the Infliction evidence to the Bloody
Sunday Inquiry ended on Friday 9 May 2003 with testimony from serving and
ex-Security Service/MI5 officers,
including “whistleblowers” David Shayler and girlfriend Annie Machon. On
Saturday 10 May 2003 the Stakeknife bombshell was primed for lobbing into the
public arena through facilitated press disclosure the following day, giving
impetus to an Anglo-Irish intelligence deception by transforming it into a
hyper news event. The 11 May Stakeknife explosion was simply lift-off. Like a
rolling thunder the story rumbled on, crowding out speculation on Infliction’s
identity and other issues.
A case of the respective states doing their duty to
self interest, and note the consummate ease with which they carried it off.
What does that say about the supposed independence of our media – north and
south of the border and on the “mainland”?
On Monday 12 May 2003, Martin “whistleblower” Ingram
gave evidence to the Saville Inquiry. Ingram was the chief architect of the
Stakeknife story at a remove. His evidence to the Inquiry, like that of David
Shayler and Annie Machon, was found wanting.
Best it should with MI5 Infliction disclosure which
preceded it, be buried under a triggered Stakeknife mudslide.
It was.
Returning to why Infliction did not attend the
Saville Tribunal. It was said to compel a presence would have infringed his
human rights, in that it could disclose his identity and endanger his life.
If there is potential in that claim, there were yet
more pressing reasons for MI5 not wishing Infliction’s attendance at the
tribunal.
Hoisting the human rights flag may have been an
expedient to deflect from them.
Revealing the identity of Infliction directly or
inadvertently through statements and/or evidence to the Inquiry, would put a
cat among the pigeons, the ramifications of which are profound.
His unmasking would do more than expose the deep
penetration of the republican movement, it would open a window to countless IRA
operations made possible by default.
I allude to those actions effectively given the green
light by intelligence agencies in acceptance of the possible consequences,
including the landing, dispersal and end use of munitions from North America
and Libya. As it stands, the deaths, maiming and terror resulting from the use
of that weaponry, rests solely at the door of the IRA and is not properly
shared with those who for years helped in good part the driving of that
belligerence – agents and agencies of state.
By exclusively dwelling on the human rights of
Infliction, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry negated a corresponding position on the
human rights of victims of IRA actions given a free hand for operational
intelligence reasons, including those compromised as a result of intelligence
supplied by Infliction and other well placed informers.
Correction in these matters should come, even if that
coming is too late for many.
One observes as an aside, if Infliction was as earlier
noted “resettled outside the United Kingdom”, that is outside Britain and
Northern Ireland, he would have been beyond the legal reach of the Bloody
Sunday Inquiry. It being so, the tribunal could not impose and considerations
of his “human rights” would not have arisen.
It is also possible he may have non-British, or even
dual, citizenship.
*
Note: 3
As the Stakeknife element is touched on
comprehensively elsewhere in this compilation, I now confine my attention to an
aspect not previously dealt with. That is, why was Mr Scappaticci chosen for
the dubious tribute of being falsely branded Stakeknife?
My pennyworth of opinion is that he was out of favour
with a segment of the republican movement. Given his once senior position in
the internal security unit, a feared and unpopular section within the IRA
disciplinary framework, he was a natural candidate
for whom little enough sympathy would be extended. However, the real reason for
his selection may be due to his criticism of Martin McGuinness, some of it
imparted privately to third parties, but which became known – no doubt at speed to those with an assumed brief for
tuning into the intrigues in and out of the republican movement. Faceless men
and women with a value system devoted to preserving whoever best accorded with
their interests, no matter how much it would impact harmfully on others.
McGuinness was deemed politically indispensable,
inviolable even. Scappaticci was deemed expendable. It came to pass that which
needed to be done was done. In August 1999 Stakeknife was born into this world,
destined for a short life – a mission to perform.
As Stakeknife’s coming was foreshadowed by the Bloody
Sunday Inquiry, so too was his nemesis – Infliction, on whose altar he was
propitiously “outed” on Sunday 11 May 2003.
A real agent (Infliction) protected. A bogus agent
(Stakeknife) sacrificed. A classic British intelligence
deception.
Yes, if simply put.
Was it, like the MI5-BSSO Operation Ward document in
the 1980’s, a piece of dissembling too clever by half?
*
Note 4:
Earlier in the aforegoing Ingram is claimed to have
said the Security Service consisted of MI5 and MI6. His terminology differs
from mine. MI5 is the Security Service, MI6 the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS).
One also notes the Security Service does not use an
acronym like its sister organisation, the Secret Intelligence Service.
*
Note 5:
To lend further context to the above, I now quote the
essence of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry conclusions on Infliction and Martin
McGuinness. It comes under the heading: “The Provisional IRA - Chapter 147 -
Volume VIII - Bloody Sunday Report”. Online.
147.349 We are unable to
obtain a written statement from Infliction, or call him to give oral evidence.
Nor was Martin McGuinness able to question him or even to be told who he was.
The same applies to the account given by the RUC interviewee. Were we
conducting a criminal trial there would in our view be substantial grounds for
the submission that it would be unfair to admit this material or to place any
reliance upon it. However, we are not conducting a trial but a public inquiry
and we are not bound by the rules of evidence. We have to consider what weight,
if any, we should give to this material, in circumstances where it has not been
possible to question Infliction about his account. We also have to consider
whether in the circumstances it would be so unfair, in the context of a public
inquiry to make any finding based on it, that we should refrain from doing so.
147.350 We have already
expressed the view that Infliction was generally reliable and did give the
information in question to the Security Service. Officer A told us that he had
no grounds for believing that what Infliction had told him was the result of
holding a grudge against Martin McGuinness. Furthermore, it should be noted
that he said to Officer B during his debriefing that ‘the Brits murdered
thirteen people’ on Bloody Sunday, so it would not appear that he was inventing
what he told Officer B (or Officer A) about Martin McGuinness in an attempt to
provide the soldiers with a reason for opening fire. If Martin McGuinness did
tell Infliction that he had fired a Thompson sub-machine gun from the Rossville
Flats on Bloody Sunday, it is in our view likely that this is what Martin McGuinness
did.
147.351 Nevertheless, our
inability and that of that of those representing Martin McGuinness to question
Infliction on such matters as to his relationship and the circumstances in
which Martin McGuinness is said to have made the remark in question, and
otherwise to test the truth of Infliction’s account and the accuracy of his
recollection, have led us to conclude that it would be unwise (and indeed
unfair) to place much weight on that account. On that basis we consider that
this account by itself does no more than raise the possibility that,
notwithstanding his denial, Martin McGuinness did fire a Thompson sub-machine
gun on ‘single’ shot from the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday.
147.352 We bear in mind two
other factors.
147.353 Firstly, there is
the evidence, apart from that of Infliction, to the effect that on Bloody
Sunday Martin McGuinness was in possession of a Thompson sub-machine gun in the
area of Chamberlain Street and William Street. We have concluded that on
balance, though far from certainly, this was the case. In reaching this
conclusion we have taken into account that Martin McGuinness had no opportunity
to question the RUC interviewee who said that he had seen Martin McGuinness
with such a weapon…
147.356 We have found that
Martin McGuinness was more likely than not to have been in possession of a
Thompson sub-machine gun in the area of Chamberlain Street and William Street,
and that he had not reached the area south of Rossville Flats when the soldiers
came into the Bogside and opened fire. We cannot conclude, however, that he
fired a Thompson sub-machine gun from the Rossville Flats. The Infliction
material raises the possibility that he did. We have set out above our reasons
for not giving much weight to this material. Accordingly, we can in this report
make no finding on that point.
147.359 What we have
concluded, however, is that there is no evidence that suggests to us that any
member of the Provisional IRA used or intended to use the march itself for the
purpose of engaging the security forces with guns or bombs. Nevertheless, we
consider it likely that Martin McGuinness was armed with a Thompson sub-machine
gun on Bloody Sunday and we cannot eliminate the possibility he fired this
weapon after the soldiers had come into the Bogside. Furthermore, we are
unable, notwithstanding their evidence, to exclude the possibility that other
members of the Provisional IRA may also have carried arms. As we have already
pointed out, we do not accept the evidence that suggested the Provisional IRA
had no nail bombs available for use on Bloody Sunday. However, in our view
no-one threw or attempted to throw a nail bomb on Bloody Sunday in any of the
sectors.
*****
(Parts 4-5)
Ingram’s Statement
to Saville Tribunal,
(The Ingram Statement bundle also had documents from
Greg McCartney, solicitor, relating to information given by Ingram to his
office, as well as a letter from the Ministry of Defence.)
Ingram Statement to Saville Inquiry: A Summary
(Inquiry Pages K12.1- K12.9).
K12.1 – “I joined the Intelligence Corps in 1980.”
K12.1 – “During 1981 I was posted to 121 Intelligence
section at Head Quarters Northern Ireland (HQNI).”
K12.1 – “After a short period I was given the job of
maintaining the Derry Republican desk.”
K12.3 – “During 1982 I was posted to North Detachment
Force Research Unit (FRU) office as a collator.”
K12.3 – “North Detachment FRU stored all the Source
material generated by FINCOS/local Unit handlers and others prior to the
formation of FRU in 1980.”
K12.6 – “I stayed in Derry until late 1984 when I was
given a compassionate posting due to the ill health of my father. I did
Security Section administrative duties relating to counter-terrorism in the UK
until mid 1987 when I was posted to Belize. On my return [to England] I
requested to attend a FRU course at Repton Manor, Ashford, Kent. I was then
posted to St Angelo (near Enniskillen) a couple of weeks after the memorial
bombing; this posting was to augment the small detachment in response to the
bombing... I remained at St Angelo until 26 September 1990…”
K12.6 – “I sought and received a posting to MOD in
London, working for Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) primarily on the Israel
and Syrian desks. This posting was an EPV (Enhanced Positive Vetting) position,
with regular and constant access to Top Secret material. EPV is the highest
clearance. In accordance with my obligations, I notified the vetting
authorities regarding my intention to marry. My proposed marriage presented
difficulties over vetting. The choices of permanent postings would have limited
my career options and the only alternative was for me not to marry my wife. As
a result of this, I applied for and received a Premature Voluntary Retirement
(PVR) which cost me £600. I left the Army with an Exemplary record.”
K12.6 – “Sometime during 2000 Liam Clarke of The
Sunday Times acted as a messenger between Greg McCartney, a solicitor to a
number of the families who are represented at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and
myself. To the best of my ability, and bearing in mind my responsibilities
under the Official Secrets [K12.7] Act (OSA), I helped McCartney with a series
of questions. I supplied Mr. McCartney with this information on a voluntary
basis for two primary reasons. First, because I am suspicious that the Army
would not make a full disclosure of all relevant documents to the Inquiry, and
secondly, because I personally believed that the Inquiry should be given full
and complete information to enable it to examine and report on the events on
Bloody Sunday so that justice can be seen to be done for all concerned.”
*
Note:
On page nine, final page of this item, are my
handwritten notes. “The writing of this document is professional, at least in
its use of grammar, if not all of its content, some of which would win a gold
medal for a brass neck. Was it written in conjunction with another party? I am
saying it may not be entirely the writing of Martin Ingram.”
I recommend a reading of an undated missive from
Martin Ingram to Greg McCartney, solicitor, listed in his statement bundle to
the Saville Inquiry, pages K12.13 and K12.14 refer. Selectively carried below
(and available online).
*****
(Parts 6-7)
Ingram’s Submission
to Greg McCartney
CONTENTS:
Excerpts from an undated submission by Martin Ingram
to Greg McCartney, solicitor, on pages K12.13 and K12.14 of the Martin Ingram
Statement bundle to the Saville Inquiry. I relate to [K12.13]: “INFLICTION AND
SOURCE REPORTS IN GENERAL…
“…Source/Agent Reports[.] the [sic] following are the
only Agencies that operate in thearte [sic].”
K12.13 – Ingram says that in the early days of the
Troubles, the RUC were “Intelligence nieve” [sic] and
their coverage was “sparse”. “It is probable over the last 28 years that the
Agents will have from time to time made information available to their handlers
although i [sic] would expect contemperanous [sic]
reports to be few and far between…”
K12.13 – “Box [MI5 = BOX] are not the best at working
in an [sic] hostile environment and consequently their coverage in Derry was
minimal.”
K12.13 – “The authenticity of the [Infliction] report
is open to question, not because it raises a ‘Red Herring’ i.e. Mr. McGiuness [sic] involvement in firing the ‘First’ shot that
precipitated the tragic day but because the report is written in terms that i
[sic] have never seen in a BOX report. The important detail missing either by
design or accident is the grading of the Source i.e. his (Agent) reliability in
his previous reporting and any collateral intelligence to back up the
information imparted, e.g. B2 usually reliable and there is collateral, it
cannot be over exaggerated the importance of the Grading because the reader
would not normally be aware of the identity of the Agent, thus he or she must
make a reasoned judgement to the importance of the information. The signal was
sent from [The] Hague, this is consistent with an extraction and resettlement
of an exposed recovered Agent and the final briefing is being undertaken remote
from his normal environment…
“The state appears to be dining ála
[sic] carte, it is unfair to cherry pick and use only the Intelligence that
suits [K12.14] your perception of events.
“All Intelligence reports presented to the inquiry
[sic] can easily be authenticated by inspecting the classified document
register. Each document as [sic] a life and this is relatively easy to follow
if you know where to look.
“Regards. please [sic] make allowance for the
spelling no spell check on this model.”
*
Note:
1) In the above Ingram tacitly accepts the Infliction
report is an MI5 document, even if he questions its authenticity because “by
design or accident” it is bereft of grading. Yet in a Memorandum – re.
Ingram-Greg McCartney telephone exchange on 07.04.00, supplied by McCartney
& Casey, solicitors, to the Saville Inquiry on 21 June 2002, Ingram implied
the report was an MI6 debrief, also claiming it was a “total fabrication”.
Between 7 April 2000 and the above undated submission to McCartney & Casey,
and in his third witness statement to the Tribunal dated 17.03.03 – pages
K12.40 to K12.42 refer – that view was moderated. Indeed, in the latter there
was a retreat from a denial to an acceptance of the existence of MI5 agent
Infliction.
Was Martin Ingram’s original questioning of the
authenticity of the Infliction report due to its lack of grading and his
reference to news articles used to make an artificial point to set up a process
in support of his brief?
2) My end document hand written notes. “Poor presentation.
Is the above a natural Ingram document? Other work by him seems to have had
professional input in the preparation. Like his Bloody Sunday Inquiry witness
statements and articles said to have been written by him in the Irish News, the Andersonstown News and the
Guardian.”
Was the above submission a pick and mix - Ingram’s
natural shaping of a general MI5 direction? Whatever, it appears to be a lend a hand gesture of little worth.
I’m saying that like almost all security leaks given
by “whistleblowers”, it takes a couple of steps forward and
then falls flat on its face. Nearer to ephemera than intelligence worth. Only
staying aloft because it is given wings by a driven media.
Undated. Misspelling. Bad grammar. Sloppy typing. The
real Ingram?
*****
(Parts 8-9)
Saville Inquiry
Ruling on Martin Ingram
Martin Ingram – Saville Inquiry Ruling on Screening,
etc. –
INTRODUCTION
P1 – “This is an application by Martin Ingram (a
pseudonym), a former serving soldier who is due to give evidence before the
Inquiry.
P2 – “The application seeks an ‘order to implement
appropriate measures to ensure the screening of his physical appearance and the
non disclosure of his true identity when he gives evidence before the Inquiry.’
He asserts that he ‘has genuine and reasonable fears as to the potential
consequences of disclosure of his personal details and his physical appearance
which justify the exceptional measures of screening and non disclosure of his
identity.’ He further asserts that the grant of this application ‘will not
prejudice the fundamental objective of the Inquiry to find the truth about
Bloody Sunday…’
“ANONYMITY
P6 – “12 Martin Ingram’s claim for anonymity is based
essentially on the threat to his own safety if his identity is revealed. The
certificate by the Defence Secretary supports anonymity by reference to the
safety of members of special units which, it is said would be jeopardized if
the identity of Martin Ingram was known.
P7 – “15 Taking into account these considerations,
including the exposition of the court of appeal in R. v. Saville (28 June
1999), we are satisfied that Martin Ingram’s subjective fears are objectively
justified and he should have anonymity in these proceedings.
“SCREENING
P7 – “16 As with anonymity, the claims for screening
is supported by the Defence Secretary’s [PII] certificate.”
*
Note:
The application for anonymity and screening was
granted. The ban included no videoing or public viewing of the witness.
Contrast the screening request to the photographs in
the “Eye-Spy” magazine interview (an undated online page but post 2004) and the
open face Suzanne Breen Sunday Tribune
interview (20.02.06). The former has two photographs of Martin Ingram, one
front face, the other profile. In each a misht
cloud obscures the essence of his features, but not the full face. Indeed,
sufficient of his physiognomy, front and side, remains exposed to make for a reasonable
possibility of identification.
Is there an answer to a request for screening in the
first instance (Bloody Sunday Inquiry in 2003) and being cavalier in the second
instance, the Eye Spy photographs – of 2005-6? – and subsequently? Is the
former there to preclude his image because exposure would make known his
whereabouts in the republic of Ireland, before and after his evidence to the
Saville Inquiry, especially when writing and publishing the Stakeknife book,
wisely after giving evidence to the Inquiry?
Could the purpose of the Eye Spy magazine photographs
be a way of saying that a man in Ireland was not Martin Ingram?
[On Wednesday 11.07.12 several lines of angry text
were deleted at this point; they were originally penned in response to external
interference to my non Internet connected computer when writing previous full
paragraph in a Friday 02.09.11edit. A regular experience.]
*****
(Parts 10-14)
Saville Inquiry
Transcript and Notes Thereon
Saville Inquiry Transcript, Day 329,
(Ingram questioned by Mr. Glasgow QC “[representing]
a large number of the soldiers who were present on the day and it is on their
behalf that I want to ask you just about two matters.” His questioning began on
Inquiry page 145. We begin on page 152 – Line 14.)
“Q The last matter, is this: you tell the Tribunal,
but by [al]l means look at it, if you like, at K12.7 [Ingram’s Statement]. Of
course you shall see it, 2.7 [sic] at the top of the page, which is part of
your paragraph 13, that you are concerned that the Inquiry should be given full
and complete information to enable it to examine and report on the events of
Bloody Sunday.
“That was a sincere wish; was it?” “A. I hope so.”
“Q. If that is right, Mr. Ingram, why did you not approach this Tribunal
directly; why did you decide to take a roundabout route, if I may put it like
that?” [P153] “A. I think the Tribunal will tell you privately that I had a
very good reason for that, which reasons you are obviously not aware of.” “Q.
If I am in ignorance it may be right that I am kept there, I often am.
“If we look at the final paragraph of Mr. McCartney’s
very helpful note [K12.11 to K12.12], K12.12 – we must not be misled by the
date at the top, I think that is the date when he very kindly ran this off his
computer so the Tribunal could see it. This is an attendance note of a
conference with you that lasted, as we see, one and three-quarter hours [It was
three quarters of an hour].” “A. It was a telephone conversation.”
“The very last thing that you apparently said to him
was that you suggested that you would be prepared to meet with Counsel for the
family on a confidential basis and not simply doing what the vast majority of
other people have done and go to the Tribunal and tell them the truth?” “A.
Well, let me just – if I may, I will take the [P154] opportunity, in so much
within the parameters that I can.
“My details were leaked to this Inquiry by a Special
Branch officer and when I was arrested under the Official Secrets Act in relation
to other matters, I was then in the process of helping Mr. McCartney. Now,
given personal circumstances, of which the Inquiry are well aware, I was
reluctant to be actually here today; this was not my wish to be here, and I do
not mean that as in any, um, derogatory way to the families, because I am more
than happy to be here today. But from a personal point of view, this is not
good for me.
“However, I was persuaded by the Inquiry, on the foot
of some legal action that if I did not – and that is why I am here today, sir.”
“Q. When you had that conversation and offered to meet the Counsel to the
families on a confidential basis in April 2000… “A. Yes.” “Q. …had you in fact
already approached the Tribunal yourself, because if that is the position I have
misstated it and I must correct it?” “A. No.”
“Q. Because that appears to have been indicated by
Mr. [Eamonn] McCann [P155] in his newspaper article, that you approached the
Tribunal in February?” “A. I do not know the dates. We had been in – basically
what happened was: Mr. [Liam] Clarke did an article in the paper, which was
brief and to the point, which was that basically I do not think all the
documents would have discovered up under discovery and from that I think the
Inquiry wrote to Mr. Clarke – and trying to seek information.
“In the intervening period I was arrested and,
contrary to any agreement they had with the police, they leaked the details to
the Inquiry and the Inquiry then contacted my legal advisors.”
“Q. All I was asking, and I hope there is nothing
improper in this, Mr. Ingram: had you already spoken to the Inquiry before you
telephoned the families’ lawyers and offered to meet them confidentially?” “A.
The answer to that is a straight: no. I spoke to the families –“ “Q. First?”
“A. And let me explain why. My intent was not to give formal evidence because
of my personal circumstances, nevertheless I wanted to help the families.”
“Q. I am sure that is right and I do not doubt your
desire to help the families. But you should have the [P156] opportunity, I
think of just dealing with the newspaper articles, because they may be wrong.
You very kindly produced them for us at K12.37. What we were told in those
articles – there are three of them, but they are almost identical, the second
paragraph [K12,37 – The Sunday Tribune, By Eamonn McCann]: ‘The man known to
the media as Martin Ingram, met with lawyers for the Tribunal under Lord
Saville three months ago.’ That would indicate that you met the Tribunal at the
end of February. I think on what you are saying that must be a mistake?”
“A. No, I think that is actually accurate, I think –
I do not imagine I would have said I had met with them if I had not met with
them. I am sure the Inquiry will tell you when and where we met – they will not
tell you where, but will tell you when.” “Q. Again the Tribunal will know the
position, but I thought it right you should have the opportunity of dealing
with it.” “A. No, I think –“ “Q. Mr. McCartney’s note, you see, indicates that
the first contact you had was on 7th April when you were offering to
meet the Counsel for the family on a confidential basis, whereas you yourself
are very properly exhibiting a newspaper article – in face [sic] three
newspaper [P157] articles – which would indicate you had already met the
Tribunal lawyers in February.
“I wonder whether you could help the Tribunal just to
clear up that apparent inconsistency?” “A. Although Mr. McCartney may not
remember, I did actually speak to Mr. McCartney a considerable period before –“
“LORD GIFFORD [interjecting] My question was: is this not a different year? The
newspaper article is 2001 and the McCartney notes are 2000.” “Mr. GLASGOW: I am
very grateful, that may clarify. Does that help?” “A. [Ingram] That helps a
lot, sir.”
“[GLASGOW] The newspaper we have on the screen is
2000. I am afraid I have not got a date on mine, but it is 2001. Thank you very
much.” “A. [Ingram] Does that –“ “A. [GLASGOW] Thank you very much, Mr. Ingram,
yes, it does indeed.”
“Questioned by Mr. Roxburgh
“LORD SAVILLE: Mr. Roxburgh, do you have any
information on dates and so on in relation to Mr. Ingram approaching or being
approached by this Inquiry?” “ Mr. ROXBURGH: No, I do not have dates to hand
about that very early stage, I am afraid.”
*
Note:
1) Ingram teases on being a witness under duress,
playing with Counsel, saying: “Now, given personal circumstances of which the
Inquiry are well aware, I was reluctant to be actually here today.” Ultimately,
he is forthcoming: “However, I was persuaded by the Inquiry, on the foot of
some legal action that if I did not – that is why I am here today, sir.”
The tribunal was not forthcoming on when he was
forthcoming, when they communicated with him or how they communicated with him,
was it through his solicitor John Wadham? The picture painted is that Ingram
was only there under duress. That’s not the Martin Ingram we had presented to
us by Liam Clarke in The Sunday Times on 20 February 2000.
2) Page 2 headlines: “Army agent offers to give
Bloody Sunday evidence.”
Paragraph two: “Ingram
has offered to cast fresh light on the shooting dead of 13 civil-rights
marchers by the Parachute Regiment on Bloody Sunday in 1972 if he is allowed to
testify anonymously at Lord Saville’s public inquiry, which opens next month.”
Paragraph five: “Ingram
said last night: ’I am very willing to help with these inquiries. I
believe it is part of the healing process in Northern Ireland for the truth
to come out and I will have things to say about what I know of the IRA as
well as the army, but I do not want to be jailed for doing so.’”
Paragraph six: “The
offer to help has been made through John Wadham, the director of Liberty, who
is Ingram’s solicitor. Wadham, one of Britain’s leading civil rights experts,
said: ‘Martin has shown courage in coming forward to expose wrongdoing and
should not be turned into the villain.’”
Paragraph twelve: “Last night Wadham said:
‘Journalists who try to investigate wrongdoing by the state should not be
subject to this treatment. I will now
be contacting Lord Saville’s and John Stevens’ inquiry to offer my client’s
services to them, provided he is not prosecuted for coming forward.’”
(Emphasis where used is mine.)
3) That’s some conflict. I ask: why the script change?
Was it because the reluctant man of honour made for a better image of a
witness: “I didn’t want to get involved but was ‘persuaded’”, sort of thing?
Was Ingram’s testimony made more compelling by virtue of his perceived
impartiality – being there on threat “of some legal action” consequent of dirty
tricks by Special Branch?
One is reminded that Special Branch are the official
cat’s paw of MI5. Some have it that they and MI5 combined are what is known as
the security services. Others say M15 and M16 are the security services. Maybe
the combo is down to what you fancy!
4) An additional puzzlement is entailed. At the time
of the Saville Tribunal sitting in Derry and at the relevant time in London, Mr
Ingram was said to have been resident in the republic of Ireland, placing him
outside UK jurisdiction and facilitating his writing the Stakeknife book. A
domicile that would put him beyond the reach of a UK court or tribunal. And, to
take him at his word, he was by then a naturalised Irish citizen with an Irish
passport.
In reality, Martin Ingram could have lawfully given
the Margaret Thatcher “victory” salute to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry without
fear of retribution. Perhaps it slipped his mind where he was living and that
he was at the time, officially at least, a “Paddy”?
5) Based on the limited excerpt of the Inquiry
transcript reproduced above, it seems that someone was remiss in the homework
supplied to Mr. Glasgow, whose language proclaims a person decent and
gentlemanly. However, one queries if these were the best qualities for the
brief, given that the Inquiry was inquisitorial rather than adversarial?
Maybe an attack dog for a rough diamond (Ingram)
would have been more efficacious?
[Evidence, as I see it, that my non Internet
connected computer is again subject to intrusion. I refer to the writing of the
previous sentence. The interference now appears to have ceased.]
Which leads to a separate question. By what criteria
were counsel chosen? Was there unseen input into selection? The British have a
long history of ensuring the outcome of committees or panels of inquiry by
manipulating their loading.
A tradition of balanced bias.
*****
(Parts 15-16)
The Sunday Times,
20.02.00 – Ingram on the Saville Inquiry
Though this newspaper article is selectively referred
to in above analysis of Martin Ingram’s Saville Inquiry transcript, Counsel for
a “large number of the soldiers present on [Bloody Sunday]” seemed unaware of
its existence. A pity. If he had only known, he would surely have avoided the background
confusion to Ingram’s evidence. There may be an answer for the conflict.
Whatever, the full article is carried below.
The Sunday Times, 20 February 2000 (Page 2):
“Army agent offers to give Bloody Sunday evidence –
By Liam Clarke
“A BRITISH Army whistleblower has offered to give
evidence of how colleagues burned a police office to obstruct an inquiry into
collusion with loyalist terror groups. The soldier, better known by the
pseudonym Martin Ingram, has been the subject of a nationwide manhunt since he
made the claim to The Sunday Times last November. * “Ingram has offered to shed
fresh light on the shooting dead of 13 civil-rights marchers by the Parachute
Regiment on Bloody Sunday in 1972 if he is allowed to testify anonymously at
Lord Saville’s public inquiry, which opens next month. * “In an interview with
The Sunday Times last year, he said he had seen intelligence files relating to
Bloody Sunday which showed the IRA had been ordered not to open fire. This
contradicts claims by the British army that they expected to be attacked.
“The Sunday Times has been bound by an injunction,
the precise terms of which it is forbidden to reveal, since it published
Ingram’s story of his work in the secretive Force Research Unit, which handles
all military intelligence informants in Northern Ireland. The injunction
prevents us giving further details of his knowledge of events on Bloody Sunday.
* “Ingram said last night: ‘I am very willing to help with these inquiries. I
believe it is part of the healing process in Northern Ireland for the truth to
come out and I will have things to say about what I know of the IRA as well as
the army, but I do not want to be jailed for doing so.’
“The offer to help has been made through John Wadham,
the director of Liberty, who is Ingram’s solicitor. Wadham, one of Britain’s
leading civil rights experts, said: ‘Martin has shown courage to come forward
to expose wrongdoing and should not be turned into the villain.’ * “One of
Ingram’s most sensitive revelations was that an army undercover unit, trained
in burglary, burned offices occupied by John Stevens, then the deputy chief
constable of Cambridgeshire, at Carrickfergus near Belfast. The covert methods
of entry team, instructors for the intelligence corps, burnt the office because
Stevens, now the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was planning to
arrest one of FRUs top agents.
“The agent Brian Nelson, was acting as intelligence
officer for the Ulster Freedom Fighters, a loyalist terrorist group. Nelson was
jailed on several counts of conspiracy to murder in 1992.
“Stevens is formally in charge of the hunt for Ingram
and is also heading an inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane, a solicitor
killed by the UFF, allegedly with FRU collusion, in 1989. * “Another
sensational revelation concerned a decision to allow a number of guns to remain
in the hands of the IRA in order to preserve the cover of an informant. One of
these guns was used in the murder of Neil Clarke, a young British soldier on
patrol in Londonderry in 1984. * “The newspaper took great pains to ensure
legitimate methods of intelligence gathering were not endangered and that no
living agents were compromised. Despite the care that was taken, the MoD and
Metropolitan Police special branch have launched an extensive search for
Ingram. In the manhunt at least one soldier has been arrested on suspicion of
being Ingram and several others have been questioned.
“A relative of the arrested soldier, who has been
released, has had her house wrecked in a police raid and a special branch
investigation has also been launched in an effort to discover the paper’s
sources. According to information given by the arrested soldier, the telephone
of at least one Sunday Times journalist has been tapped and transcripts of
conversations made.
“Last night Wadham said: ‘Journalists who try to
investigate wrongdoing by the state should not be subject to this treatment. I
will now be contacting Lord Saville’s and John Stevens’ inquiry to offer my
client’s services to them, provided he is not prosecuted for coming forward.’
“A solicitor acting for the family of James Wray, one
of the civil-rights marchers killed on Bloody Sunday, has also called for
Ingram to be allowed to testify. Greg McCartney said: ‘We have always encouraged
people with relevant information to come forward and we have taken the view
that no person should face any punishment for giving the inquiry relevant
information even if it is in breach of the Official Secrets Act.’
“’So-called whistleblowers should be encouraged to
speak without sanction.’”
*****
(Part 17)
The Observer,
05.10.03 – Ingram’s Military Service
The Observer, 05.10.03 (Online)
P1 – “Ingram served as an NCO for 12 years in the
British Army’s Intelligence Corps and six years inside the Force
Research Unit.”
Note: The above claims 18 years service, which, to my
knowledge, is the minimum amount of years for pension qualification. If true,
it contradicts all other presentations on Ingram’s army term. Ingram’s Witness
Statement to the Saville Tribunal (26.07.02) says he enlisted in 1980, and the
book, Stakeknife – Britain’s Secret Agents in Ireland (2004), says he left in
1991.
The writer applies the English language badly.
Another reading would say that Ingram did twelve years in the army, almost all
in G2 (Intelligence Corps), of which six years were in the Force Research Unit,
an elite unit within G2. So twelve years in all.
******
NOTE: End of First Half of “Martin Ingram” Document –
Parts 1-17. Emphasis used is mine.
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